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Seegers Lecture
TO ADJUDICATE OR MEDIATE:
THAT IS THE QUESTION'
ALFRED W. MEYER-
The contracts professor sought to establish the proposition that the perfect
tender rule does not apply to an installment contract for the sale of goods. He
therefore posed the following hypothetical to his class: Two parties entered into
a six-month contract for the sale of 6000 units, 1000 to be delivered each
month. Conforming deliveries are made in the first two months, but in the third
month only 900 units are shipped. The question is: "As Seller, what would
you say in response to the angry Buyer's notification that Buyer rejects the
shipment and considers himself discharged from any further obligations under
* This is the revised text of the tenth Seegers Lecture delivered at the Valparaiso University
School of Law on March 17 and 18, 1993. The style and colloquial tone of the original lecture have
been retained. Footnotes have been added. The text was prepared while on sabbatical at the Indiana
University School of Law-Bloomington. I thank Dean Alfred C. Aman, Jr. and his staff and
faculty at I.U. for their hospitality and for the facilities which they provided. Special thanks to
Professor Harry Pratter for a close and helpful reading.
I have chosen a topic for this lecture that features the dispute settlement process of mediation
because of two experiences. The first was my attendance at a Harvard Law School program seven
years ago in which Professor Frank Sander held forth on the projects that had begun at Harvard on
alternative dispute resolution processes. At that time I, and I suspect most of us, had not even heard
of what is now known by its acronym, ADR, nor had I heard of Frank Sander, the leading guru of
the movement.
I returned to Valparaiso a convert-at least a convert to the extent that I thought somebody
should do something in our shop about this "new and different" approach to dispute settlement, a
kinder and gentler way of resolving disputes. Whether it is the Socratic method in the classroom
or the adversary procedure in the courtroom, neither law professors, nor law students, nor attorneys,
nor clients are supposed to "feel good all over" (like Little Orphan Annie) as they study, practice,
or participate in litigation. "Meeeediation," ugh!, the sound of the word suggests that it is for
wimps. It may be appropriate for clinical psychologists and social workers but certainly not for law
students or lawyers. Well, I overcame my misgivings with the thought that if Harvard, a battered
but still a bastion of conservative legal traditions, was devoting attention to ADR, it couldn't be all
bad. So I began to offer a seminar, which led to my second experience.
In the summer of 1988, I joined a delegation of mediators and ADR teachers in a People-to-
People sponsored program, visiting cities in China to observe the use of mediation. My reaction
from that experience is that, as we enter an age whose buzz words are globalization and multi-
culturalism, mediation is and will be looked to in increasing measure as one of the leading, if not
the most prevalent technique, of dispute resolution. Thus, ADR is a subject whose time has come.
- The Louis and Anna Seegers Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law.
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the contract?" As the professor glanced around the room full of students
suddenly staring at their notes and shoelaces, only one hand had risen, it being
the hand of a young boy, a class visitor sitting next to his law student-father.
With misgivings, the professor, having made eye-contact with the young boy,
said: "Well, what would you say?" The response: "I'd say: 'I'm sorry'."
Obviously the young boy needed a legal education, because being a lawyer
means never having to say you're sorry.' Law students learn to be adversarial
and competitive, not apologetic. But new methods of dispute resolution have
emerged, which the legal profession must closely examine and develop into
viable alternatives.
I. INTRODUCTION
This Lecture attempts a critical examination of two processes of dispute
resolution: adjudication and mediation. Adjudication is the time and tradition-
honored technique in the Anglo-American jurisprudence of trials, while
mediation, although not without ancient and honorable roots in other cultures,
is a comparative newcomer on the American scene. In the movement known as
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), adherents of mediation promote its
virtues as a preferred dispute resolution alternative to litigation and the process
of adjudication. This Introduction will seek to polarize the issues by offering
a number of pejorative comparisons and contrasts between the two processes.
Part II will then describe the analytical framework of the two processes. In Part
III, I will address the controversial adversarial ethic of adjudication by exploring
its historical development and then by examining the arguments that attack and
defend it. In Part IV, I will discuss the extent to which mediation has become
a part of our dispute settlement arsenal, the issues it raises, and the claims made
on its behalf as a preferred process to that of adjudication. Part V will be a
"Man from LaMancha" routine in which I will attempt-and fail-to adequately
describe the impact of modem (and post-modern) jurisprudential theories on the
value questions involved in the adjudication versus mediation debate.
Adjudication is the process whereby the disputants or their representatives
present proofs and reasoned arguments to a third party who is to find the facts
and apply an external, normative standard (the law!) to determine the winner and
loser. By contrast, mediation is the process in which the disputing parties
present their respective versions of the facts of the dispute to a third party who
is to help them find a basis for a settlement agreement. The former is
adversarial and competitive; the latter, collaborative and problem-solving. The
former results in zero sum outcomes (one wins at the expense of the other); the
1. The story is based on an anecdote reported in KENNEY HEGLAND, INTRODUCTION TO THE
STUDY AND PRACTICE OF LAW, 283-84 (1983).
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latter results in joint gains (classical contract theory-each party values the
other's entitlement more than his own-for example, the seller values the
buyer's money more than his goods and the buyer values the goods more than
his money). The former is formal, elaborate, and expensive; the latter,
conversational, flexible, and cost effective. The former is time consuming; the
latter, expeditious. The former is an involuntary imposition of external,
abstract, and objective norms (the law of the sovereign); the latter involves
internal, personalized, and contextual interests (private law-a contract-made
by and for the parties themselves). Finally, and most pejoratively, the former
is macho, aggressive, and contentious, while the latter is wimpy, passive, and
compromising. While there is some truth in each of these comparisons and
contrasts, it is the distorted truth of caricature, the kind of truth one expects in
a debate between zealots. Perhaps, however, these characterizations will serve
to set the stage and help us to recognize the heroes and villains as they emerge
in the analysis that follows.
11. ADJUDICATION AND MEDIATION: THEORETICAL BASES
One has no justifiable alternative but to begin an analysis of adjudication
and mediation with an account of the theoretical work done in the 1960s by Lon
L. Fuller, the then Carter Professor of Jurisprudence at the Harvard Law
School. At the time of his retirement in 1972, he was generally acclaimed as
the preeminent American legal philosopher. He addressed the subject of this
Lecture in two articles titled: The Forms and Limits of Adjudication,2 and
Mediation-Its Forms and Functions.3 The titles reveal what distinguishes these
articles from most of the past and contemporary literature on the subjects.
Forms, limits, and functions were the concepts that made Fuller's career a
testimonial to a concern for process. He was concerned with distinguishing
diverse types of legal processes, identifying their relationships to each other, and
articulating the limits which would preserve what he defined as the "internal
morality" of each. His purpose was not to show that one process was better
than another, but rather to demonstrate that each process served a distinctive
purpose; its appropriate use depended on the nature of the problem to be
resolved, the resources available, and the values to be realized. In his general
approach to what he termed "principles of order," Fuller identified five
processes: adjudication, mediation, contract, legislation, and managerial
direction.4
2. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978)
[hereinafter Fuller, Adjudication].
3. Lon L. Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 305 (1971)
[hereinafter Fuller, Mediation].
4. Fuller, Adjudication, supra note 2, at 363, 398; Fuller, Mediation, supra note 3, at 338.
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We are concerned in this Lecture with the first two, adjudication and
mediation. However, we cannot ignore the third, contract, not only because that
is the course I teach, but also because, as I hope will become evident, the
process of mediation is designed to culminate in a contract-an agreement
between the parties. What distinguishes contract and mediation from the other
principles of order is their moral force, the force derived from the parties having
made law for themselves.
A. Adjudication
Fuller argued that the optimum condition for the functioning of adjudication
lies in the fact that it confers on the affected party a particular kind of
participation-the presentation of proofs and reasoned arguments in a setting that
is institutionally defined and assured.' Whatever enhances this participation
increases its efficacy; whatever detracts from it impairs its internal morality.
Several propositions follow from the use of the phrase 'reasoned argument'.
Fuller acknowledged that the reliance on "communication and persuasion"
necessarily "presuppose[s] some shared context of principle."6 But what is to
be the source of the principle? The facile answer is that judges rule and decide
by applying the law, thus ensuring the triumph of justice. But it should be
obvious that herein lies the rub, a rub which we must confront in Part IV of this
Lecture. Our present concern is to compare processes, not to examine the
claims of value involved in the processes. The process of adjudication assumes
the application of an external standard-namely "the law"-as contrasted with
that of mediation, which looks to an outcome determined by the agreement of
the parties, whereby the parties make the law for themselves.
It may be useful to summarize a number of propositions that flow from the
"forms and limits" of adjudication: the process should not be initiated by the
deciding tribunal (such would compromise the neutrality or impartiality of the
judge);7 the decision should be accompanied by reasons (the reasoned arguments
of the parties deserve a reasoned response from the judge);' the decision should
not rest on grounds not argued by the parties (such would compromise the
integrity of the parties's participation);9 the decision should operate
retrospectively to the dispute between the litigating parties (the participating
litigants represent only themselves, not other members of the public or the
public interest);'0 and, finally, the process is inherently unsuited for what
5. Fuller, Adjudication, supra note 2, at 363-66.
6. Id. at 373.
7. Id. at 385-87.
8. Id. at 387-88.
9. Id. at 388-91.
10. Id. at 391-92.
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Fuller termed "polycentric" tasks, where the resolution of the issue between the
participating parties will have an impact on issues affecting a multiplicity of
parties, whether formally represented or not."
B. Mediation
ADR proponents advance mediation as an ethical antidote for the ills of
adjudication. Fuller's treatment of mediation, although cited by all as the
pioneering contribution to the literature, offers little solace for this point of
view. Describing his essay as "tentative" and "imperfect, " " he resorted to
narrative and his own experience in union-management disputes to describe the
forms and limits of mediation as an unexplored resource for social ordering.
The contrast in methodology between the two articles may readily be explained.
Adjudication had been subjected to extensive coverage in literature, having won
its place in our legal' system in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. By
contrast, mediation was a stranger to our legal system, although it had been
explored by anthropologists and comparative sociologists who studied its use in
primitive civilizations and in non-western cultures. Fuller's article on mediation
broke scholarly legal ground and provided the theoretical framework for the
contemporary use and discussion of mediation.
Unlike his article on adjudication, which is analytical and theoretical, Fuller
demonstrated the potential attributes (the forms and limits) of mediation by the
use of illustrations drawn from three factually specific contexts: an employer-
union contract,' 3 a marriage contract, 4 and an allocation of an inadequate
water supply to farmers.' 5 What he found in common among these three
problems, and what warranted the non-adversarial process of mediation in the
first two and what he called "consultative" techniques 6 in the third, were (1)
relationships of heavy interdependence exerting a strong pressure to reach
agreements, and (2) an absence of rules requiring, prohibiting, or attaching
specific consequences to acts. Thus, Fuller characterized the central quality of
mediation to be its unique capacity to "reorient the parties toward each other,
not by imposing rules on them, but by helping them to achieve a new and shared
perception of their relationship, a perception that will redirect their attitudes and
dispositions toward one another." "
11. Id. at 394-404.
12. Fuller, Mediation, supra note 3, at 339.
13. Id. at 309.
14. Id. at 330.
15. Id. at 334.
16. Id. at 336-37.
17. Id. at 325.
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For comparative purposes, it may be helpful to repeat Fuller's
characterization of adjudication's unique capacity: to allow participation of the
parties by the presentation of proofs and reasoned arguments. We need not treat
the details of his mediation illustrations except to note that the criteria for their
inclusion foreshadow those recommended by modem proponents of mediation,
which will be discussed in Part IV of this Lecture. What deserves emphasis
here, however, is the prescience of Fuller in warning that the standard American
solution for the kind of problems in his illustrations is to move toward
"judicializing" or "legalizing" the administrative tasks they involve with the
obvious cost in reducing the consultative and mediative elements in the
operation.18 We will return to this concept when we discuss how courts and
legislatures have "co-opted" mediation by making it a part of pre-trial procedure
in adversary litigation.
III. ADJUDICATION AND THE ADVERSARIAL SYSTEM
Proponents of mediation argue that the adversarial ethic of adjudication not
only impairs its truth-seeking function but is inimical to the ethical standards of
the legal profession. Since the adversary system was not the product of a grand
design or of purposeful development, a brief history of its evolution aids in
framing the issues for discussion.
A. Historical Development of the Adversary Process
For present purposes, an "Arabian Carpet" treatment should suffice since
the historical detail is well-documented elsewhere and will ensure that we are
not condemned to repeat the idiosyncratic and culturally conditioned mistakes of
the past. The highlights of this history, however, may best be appreciated if we
keep in mind what we have identified as the essential attributes of the end
product: (1) the neutrality or impartiality of the judge; (2) the presentation of
proofs and reasoned arguments by representatives of the parties; and, (3) a
formal, institutional setting that is controlled by rules of evidence and procedure.
Procedures for resolving disputes in the eleventh and twelfth centuries were
grisly ceremonies relying on divine intervention to determine the outcome. Trial
by battle had a short-lived history in England, having been imported from the
continent at the time of the Norman invasion. Trial by ordeal and trial by wager
of law were its successors. The outcome in each depended on the will of God.
Ordeals consisted of carrying a red hot iron bar or being immersed in deep
water. If the burn healed within a certain time or if the body briefly sank rather
than floated, the accused was declared innocent. In wager of law, the litigant
18. Id. at 337.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 27, No. 2 [1993], Art. 3
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol27/iss2/3
1993] TO ADJUDICATE OR MEDIATE 363
presented his case by taking a prescribed oath, attested to by the oaths of
witnesses (called "compurgators") from his neighborhood, that he was a truth-
teller. Winning depended upon whether the litigant and his witnesses were able
to recite the complicated oath forms without mistake. God would twist the
tongues of those who were lying. While battle, ordeal, and wager of law
suggest a form of adversarialness, they can hardly be cited as influencing what
we now describe as the adversarial system. The outcome of the battle, ordeal,
or wager was the exclusive basis on which the dispute was resolved. If a law
school had existed at the time, a course in evidence would not have been needed
because all evidence was irrelevant and immaterial.
The events that laid the foundation for our modem adversarial system
occurred between the thirteenth and seventeenth centuries. Trial by jury began
with jurors being selected from the neighborhood in which the dispute arose.
Similar to the inquisitorial systems of the Roman and Canon law, the jurors
were expected to play an active role in using their personal knowledge and
inquiries to decide the dispute. Slowly and tortuously, adversarial features crept
in as counsel were employed, witnesses testified, and counsel made arguments,
thereby transforming the jury from an active inquisitorial role to one of passive
neutrality. The system remained, however, one of stylized, formal rules with
the judges, instead of the jury, now playing the active inquisitorial roles.
The dramatic changes that occurred during the eighteenth century in both
England and the United States and that formed the basis for our modem system
have been documented in research published by Professor Stephan Landsman. 19
He identifies three periods of the eighteenth century as especially significant.'
In the first period, the early 1700s, the judges became inquisitors by default
because counsel were not regularly present to represent the parties. Witnesses
would produce narrative testimony, which would be followed by vigorous and
"sharp-tongued" questioning by the judges. Even with counsel present, a
manifestation of "zeal" on their part was viewed during this period as a breach
of decorum. The beginning of the second stage dates from the 1730s, as
individual cases revealed party initiative in the production and interrogation of
witnesses coupled with increasing regularity of participation of counsel. By
mid-century, the presence and assertiveness of counsel in the production of
evidence signified the impending demise of inquisitorial procedure. In the final
stage, the late 1700s, the hallmarks of the adversary system were well in place:
rules of evidence, strategic use of evidentiary objections, cross-examination of
19. This historical summary is based upon and the quotes are taken from STEPHAN LANDSMAN,
ADVERSARIAL JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN APPROACH TO ADJUDICATION 1-21 (1988); Stephan
Landsman, The Rise of the Contentious Spirit: Adversary Procedure in Eighteenth Century England,
75 CORNELL L. REv. 497 (1990) [hereinafter Landsman, Adversary Procedure].
20. Landsman, Adversary Procedure, supra note 19, at 502-03.
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witnesses, use of solicitors in the preparation and investigation of cases, and, of
great significance, the neutrality of judges.
The preceding factual account of the eighteenth century documents the rise
of the adversarial system but does little to account for why it took place during
this particular period. A variety of political, social, and economic forces
influenced the development: the French and American revolutions,
industrialization, expansion of trade and commerce, shifting of power from the
landed gentry to the rising middle class, democratization of the electorate, etc.
The newly prized political and economic freedoms called for new procedures in
the courts. Disputes multiplied, and a desire grew for a legal device that could
solve the current problems facing the court without completely breaking from
the past. A "demonstrably neutral mechanism" was needed: disinterested fact
finders, party control over the proceedings, decisions based on the presentation
of the parties, and counsel trained and skilled in the arts of advocacy-ideas and
an institution whose times had come. One early example of the new "rights-
based" thinking may serve as an instructive harbinger of what was to come.
In 1692, Parliament passed a statute establishing a reward for the
apprehension and conviction of highway robbers. A professional class of
"bounty hunters" sprang up almost overnight. One in particular, Jonathan Wild,
became notorious not only for his success in apprehending the dastardly felons,
but also for his courtroom skills in procuring their convictions. As recounted
by Landsman from four early trial records, the prosecutions bore a remarkable
similarity.21  Lacking corroborative factual support (except from alleged
accomplices who were, more likely than not, his own assistants), Wild was both
the witness and the advocate relying on confessions, admissions, and hearsay to
"stage-manage" the prosecutions. The nefarious activities of Wild and others
of his ilk led to procedural reforms providing counsel with the opportunity to
use adversarial techniques to expose the fraudulent basis of the charges.
Landsman concluded his account of the historical evolution of adversarial
procedure with other instances of individuals using the courts to restrain abuses
by those in power. Treatises on the law of evidence written in the nineteenth
century were important allies to those seeking courtroom vindication of rights.
Wigmore referred to this period as the "spring-tide of the [evidence] system. "'
Of particular interest for the subject of this Lecture is the conclusion in
Landsman's "Epilogue":
[PIroposals [which would put an end to the excesses of
21. Id. at 573-77.
22. 1 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE
IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 26 (2d ed. 1923).
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contentiousness] strike at the heart of the adversarial approach to
adjudication. . . . The association between contentious methods,
procedural fairness, and liberty make anti-adversarial reforms a risky
business. Change should not be undertaken without the greatest of
care and in the light of the historical foundations of the adversary
system. What is lost may be both precious and irreplaceable. '
Whether "what is lost" might be worth losing will occupy our attention in Part
IV.
B. Adversarial Justice: The Critics
An imposing array of critics have attacked the adversary system on both
pragmatic and ethical grounds. The charge that adversary procedures are too
slow, unwieldy, and costly to respond to the needs of modem society has
prompted numerous empirical, time-and-motion studies that, as you might
expect, have not resolved the validity of the charge. Important as these
efficiency issues are, they are beyond the scope of this Lecture. Of primary
concern here are the attacks based on moral and ethical grounds.
Roscoe Pound, Jerome Frank, and Marvin Frankel, illustrious names in the
history of American jurisprudence, represent three generations of critics of the
adversary system. Pound, the legendary dean of the Harvard Law School and
founder of the school of sociological jurisprudence; Frank, Yale Law School
professor, a leading exponent of American legal realism both as an academic
and later as a federal jurist; and Frankel, Columbia Law School professor who,
like Frank, became a federal judge, each leveled attention-getting broadsides at
the ethics of adversarial procedure. Pound delivered his indictment in a speech
that was said to have "shocked" the American Bar Association in 1906.4 He
derided the "contentious" procedure as based on a "sporting theory of
justice,"' one in which "the inquiry is not, What do substantive law and
justice require? Instead the inquiry is, Have the rules of the game been carried
out strictly?" The effect, he said, is to give "the whole community a false
notion of the end and purpose of law."'
Two generations later, Jerome Frank titled a chapter of his book, Courts
on Trial,7' "The 'Fight' Theory versus The 'Truth' Theory." He likened the
23. Landsman, Adversary Procedure, supra note 19, at 604-05.
24. Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice,
29 REPORTS OF THE A.B.A. 395 (1906).
25. Id. at 404.
26. Id. at 406.
27. JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REAuTY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE (1949).
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system to a "battle of wits and wiles," the equivalent of "throwing pepper in the
eyes of a surgeon when he is performing an operation. "' With literary
references to the bitter and sarcastic observations of Kafka, Jonathon Swift, and
Damon Runyon, Frank called for new measures of reform to diminish what he
called the "martial spirit" of litigation. He called the "fight theory" a "legal
laissez-faire" with the "litigious man" replacing the "economic man."' The
individual enterprise of individual litigants would ensure that the social policies
of the legal rules would be applied to all of the relevant and actual facts.
Without denying the partial validity of the economic theory and the legal
analogy, Frank considered the postulates inadequate for both economics and law
in that observation of social and legal realities revealed the injustices produced
by each.
Finally, among this trio of adversaries of the adversary process, Judge
Frankel, in 1980, authored Partisan Justice,3° in which he lamented:
Excessive reliance on the adversary process has come to permeate our
legal institutions. The fundamental conception of rules of warfare as
the route to peace characterizes our approach to both civil and criminal
disputes. Our reliance upon adversary premises and techniques has
led to an array of disorders and dissatisfactions-from glutted courts
to the travesties of plea bargaining to the rituals and endless tinkerings
attending the Miranda warnings, and the injustices that result because
effective access to justice depends too heavily on the wealth necessary
to pay for effective lawyering.3"
According to Frank, "[W]e have fashioned a regime of individual competitive
struggle, freeing the contestants to war against each other, decreeing in large
measure that the state or its judicial representative should serve as passive
umpire to keep the conflict within broad limits.32
Considerations of time and audience patience preclude a further elaboration
of the above critics' arguments. Nor should it be necessary to list others who
have added their voices to the chorus; representatives of three generations should
suffice. The critics have had an impact on the adversary system. Procedural
reforms too numerous, too detailed, and, with apologies to those who teach civil
procedure, too boring to describe, have blunted some of the "fight theory"
criticisms. What is especially ironic, however, is that many of the well-
28. Id. at 85.
29. Id. at 92.
30. MARVIN E. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE (1980).
31. Id. at 86.
32. Id. at 11.
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intentioned reforms have exacerbated rather than curbed the abuses of adversary
advocacy.
Rules of discovery, designed to enable one side to find out crucial facts
from the other, become a powerful weapon in the arsenal of the resourceful
advocate whose word processors and printers churn out reams of standard form
inquiries to harass, to delay, and to impose added expense on the opponent.
The party responding to the discovery order may likewise frustrate the objective
by inundating the opponent with a flood of paper that may or may not include
the sought-for information. Thus, the procedural reforms thrust and the
adversary system parries to produce more costly litigation and the obvious
injustice to the litigant with lesser resources. It is not surprising that we hear
with increasing frequency of litigators who are leaving the practice, having
become disenchanted and "burned out" from a system that exacts a heavy toll
on their personal and professional satisfaction.
C. Adversarial Justice: The Defenders
In Part II, Lon Fuller was portrayed as an analytical -"process" scholar
whose primary concern was to describe the forms and limits of the dispute
settlement processes. He was, however, on record as a "true believer" in the
adversarial ethic of adjudication. He emphasized that a non-adversarial
procedure risks prematurity of judgment:
An adversary [procedure] seems the only effective means for
combatting this natural tendency to judge too swiftly in terms of the
familiar that which is not yet fully known. The arguments of counsel
hold the case, as it were, in suspension between two opposing
interpretations of it. While the proper classification of the case is thus
kept unresolved, there is time to explore all of its peculiarities and
nuances. 
33
In addition, Fuller did not see the contentiousness of the process as an
unmitigated evil because it offered a salutary outlet for pent-up emotions. He
believed that even though litigation, in a sense, appeared to waste human
resources, it was less wasteful than the consequences of alternatives in which
parties were unable to work off their animosities.
Thus, it is the observance of the process and its "limits" that ensures that
it will not be abused. And the adversarialness becomes a virtue. Fuller thought
33. Lon L. Fuller & John D. Randall, Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint
Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1160 (1958).
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that statesmanlike advocacy could see to it that the process of adjudication
achieves its most useful and least hurtful form. Attorneys, by vigorously
asserting their clients' positions, can give clients a sense of moral satisfaction.
Through concessions and a broad treatment of the case, claimed Fuller, the
attorney conveys to the court a true insight into the interests involved and leads
the court to a reasonable solution of the conflict involved.
The cynic will deny and the skeptic will question the extent to which
Fuller's use of the phrases, "statesmanlike advocacy," "moral satisfaction" of
clients, and "concessions and broad treatment of the case" are operational in the
contemporary practice of litigation.
Before leaving Fuller's views on the adversarialness of adjudication, we
should note his remarks on another and rather unique occasion. In 1959, his
colleague on the Harvard law faculty, Harold Berman, was invited by the United
States Information Agency to arrange for a series of "talks" on American law
to be broadcast by the Voice of America to audiences in Europe, Asia, and
Africa. Fuller participated in the series with a talk entitled "The Adversary
System."' He warned at the outset that the title phrase should be understood
in "a narrow sense," a sense in which the roles of the actors are clearly
circumscribed. A context in which the judge and jury must be excluded from
any partisan role, believed Fuller. And arguments must be presented by
advocates with partisan zeal in such a way that the case appears in the aspect
most favorable to their clients. Thus:
[The] advocate is not like a jeweler who slowly turns a diamond in the
light so that each of its facets may in turn be fully revealed. Instead
the advocate holds the jewel steadily, as it were, so as to throw into
bold relief a single aspect of it. It is the task of the advocate to help
the judge and jury to see the case as it appears to interested eyes, in
the aspect it assumes when viewed from that comer of life into which
fate has cast his client.3 5
Fuller spoke of a "tolerant partisanship," referring not only to a tolerance
for opposing viewpoints, but a tolerance for a partisan presentation of those
viewpoints.
In the end, the justification for the adversary system lies in the fact
that it is a means by which the capacities of the individual may be
lifted to the point where he gains the power to view reality through
34. Lon L. Fuller, The Adversary System, in TALKS ON AMERICAN LAW 34 (Harold J. Berman
ed., 2d ed. 1971).
35. Id. at 35-36.
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eyes other than his own, where he is able to become as impartial, and
as free from prejudice, as the lot of humanity will admit.36
Scholars, especially jurisprudes, are not prone to characterizing a legal
institution with such a ringing endorsement. Recalling the nature of the
audience may furnish the explanation for this aberration. Civil law systems
feature inquisitorial procedures with magistrates making findings without the aid
of advocates and without the fanfare and publicity of a trial. To the Voice of
America radio audience attuned to their own systems' susceptibility to official
tyranny and political abuse, Fuller is to be forgiven a bit of hyperbole in
trumpeting the individual and human rights virtues of adjudication.
Other proponents of the adversary system respond more directly to the
criticism that the "fight theory" does'not produce "truth." In the grandiloquent
prose of Law Day rhetoric, a trial may be described as a "search for truth."
And no less an authority than John Stuart Mill has supplied the epistemological
rationale:
Since there are few mental attributes more rare than that judicial
facility which can sit in intelligent judgment between two sides of a
question, of which only one is represented by an advocate before it,
truth has no chance but in proportion as every side of it, every opinion
which embodies any fraction of the truth, not only finds advocates, but
is advocated as to be listened to.
37
In language less prolix, Justice Handler of the New Jersey Supreme Court
supplied the judicial rationale: "Because we do not know which side truth has
taken, we let the sides fight it out. . . . In this contest, the truth will out." 3
The Pilates (and the Doubting Thomases) of this world will still want to know
what "truth" we are talking about. How can we compare the results of the
adversary system with the "true results" unless the true results are known? And
how can we know the true results except by intuition and anecdotal reports?
It may be a more helpful analysis to distinguish the goals of litigants and"
their attorneys from the goals of the system. Disputes are framed by lawyers
arguing to win for their clients. One can argue that the desire to win is both the
virtue and the vice. The desire to win prompts the lawyers to develop the
strongest and most persuasive evidence in support of each position. The result
36. Id. at 46-47.
37. JOHN S. MILL, On Libery, in ESSENTIAL WORKS OF JOHN STUART MILL 301 (M. Lerener
ed., 1961).
38. Alan B. Handler, The Judicial Pursuit of Knowledge: Truth and/or Justice, 41 RUTGERS
L. REV. 1, 4 (1988).
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is that the decision maker will be in the best position to decide the controversy.
But the competitive desire to win may tempt the litigator to "cheat" by
suppressing relevant evidence, introducing misleading (if not untruthful)
testimony, or misrepresenting applicable law. Here the goal of the system is to
develop rules of evidence and procedure that will prevent, or at least frustrate,
such behavior. By avoiding the simplistic slogan of "a search for truth," this
analysis focuses on the more meaningful inquiry of what process is best
calculated to produce the truth. That manifestations of the truth do not
invariably represent truth is not the fault of the adversary system but is rather
a result of human fallibility.
Alan Dershowitz, the attorney on appeal for Mike Tyson, argued recently
that the jury should have been given an instruction regarding the possibility that
Tyson mistakenly believed that the complaining witness had consented to sex.
As Dershowitz put it: "The practical reality is that the truth often lies someplace
in between [rape and consent]" and that "the jury could have believed he was
telling the truth and she was telling the truth and they saw it differently.
Perceptions matter." The point is well taken. Whether it be Mike Tyson, a
jury, a judge, or you or me, we are all limited by our human condition to a
perception of truth as opposed to a discovery of "the truth, the whole truth and
nothing but the truth."
D. The Morality of the Adversary System
The Lawyer, who has made not only the scales of right but also the
sword of justice his symbol, generally uses the latter not merely to
keep back all foreign influences from the former, but, if the scale does
not sink the way he wishes, he also throws his sword into it, a practice
to which he often has the greatest temptation because he is not also a
philosopher, even in morality.39
I suspect that the pro and con arguments made by members of the legal
profession-be they academics or practitioners-do not lead to a satisfying
conclusion about the morality of the adversary system. Since the Kant quotation
suggests that the "swords" in the legal arena may be insufficient analytical tools,
distinctions drawn from moral philosophy may be helpful. In much of what
follows in this section, I am indebted to a moral philosopher, David Luban,
who, without the benefit, or perhaps detriment, of a formal legal education, has
been a prolific and thoughtful author and speaker on issues of legal ethics.'
39. IMMANUEL KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE (1795)
40. The following discussion is based on DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL
STUDY 50-103 (1988).
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First, a distinction must be made between the civil and criminal justice
systems, a distinction that many of the above arguments have glossed over. The
goal of zealous advocacy in criminal defense is to curtail the power of the state.
Criminal procedures "overprotect" the rights of the accused to guard against the
danger that those in power will persecute the innocent. Thus the purpose of the
adversary system is different in the criminal and civil justice systems. In the
latter, the purpose is to achieve legal justice by determining facts, applying
norms, and awarding remedies. In criminal justice, the rules and the system are
designed to protect the accused against the state, the powerless against the power
wielders. If excessive zeal results in the acquittal of a guilty defendant, we do
not criticize the system for its failure to produce the "truth." Rather we see the
value of "truth" to be subordinate to the value of stacking the deck in such a
way as to minimize the risk that the state will persecute the innocent. Zealous
advocacy in the defense of the accused can therefore be justified on grounds not
present in the civil system. To focus on the adversary system in criminal
procedure is misconceived as a justification for its use in civil litigation.
Luban classifies the arguments for the adversary system in civil litigation
into two general categories: consequential and nonconsequential. The former
are goal-oriented and the latter intrinsic. Goal orientation arguments would
include that the adversary system is: (1) the best way to get at truth, (2) the
best way to vindicate rights, and (3) the best way to safeguard against excesses,
for example, zealous advocacy that may be morally questionable by itself is
subjected to the checks and balances of the other side being represented by a
zealous advocate with the further check of the impartial arbiter. Intrinsic
arguments are: (1) the lawyer-client relationship established by the adversary
system is intrinsically valuable, (2) the adversary system is necessary to honor
human dignity by granting every litigant a voice in the process, and (3) the
adversary process is so much a part of the fabric of our society that it would be
unjust to disturb it. In the interest of time, I will examine only the first two of
the goal-oriented arguments while providing only conclusory comments about
the others.
1. Truth
It is an empirical question whether the adversary system is the best way to
uncover truth. Alas, because we can never find out what the "true" facts were
except as the court has determined them to be, we can never answer the
question. So we must rely on non-empirical resources, a mix of a priori
theories and armchair psychology. One such argument draws an analogy to the
rationalist tradition in science which asserts that the best way to get at scientific
truth is through the dialectic of conjecture or assertion and refutation. The
analogy deserves short shrift as soon as one asks whether the scientific dialectic
would tolerate using conjectures known to be false or using procedural rules to
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exclude probative evidence.
A different argument is made in the ABA's official endorsement of the
adversary system in a conference report. The key paragraph posits the case of
the arbiter who attempts to decide a case without the benefit of partisan
advocacy. To do so, the arbiter would have to play three roles: as an advocate
presenting the most effective case for the plaintiff, as an advocate presenting the
most effective case for the defendant, and as the neutral or impartial judge who
in the process would necessarily be viewing with distrust the fruits of his prior
identifications and efforts. The report concludes that no one can successfully
play these inconsistent roles. Luban dismisses the argument rather summarily,
pointing out that it begs the question-that if it is true that facts are best
discovered by a battle between two conflicting points of view, then one person
will not do it as well as two adversaries. The report thereby makes the premise
the conclusion. Even the premise becomes questionable if one asks whether any
litigator thinks that the best way to get at the truth is through the clash of
opposing points of view. Would a trial lawyer prepare for trial by hiring two
investigators, one taking one side of every issue and one taking the other? To
ask the question is to answer it! To conclude on the basis of the foregoing that
self-interested investigation has not been proven to be the best means for getting
at the truth does not warrant abandoning the adversary system. But more of this
later.
2. Vindication of Rights
The vindication of rights argument depends not on "truth" claims but rather
on reasoning used to support the adversary system in the criminal setting;
namely, that the rights of a litigant, like the need to stack the deck for the
accused when prosecuted by the state, are a more important value than "truth."
The clash of two adversaries, under this theory, will in fact defend legal rights
most effectively. To the extent that the theory relies on analogy to eighteenth
century "invisible hand" economic theory, Luban dismisses it summarily as
myth and question-begging. The more serious issue, however, involves the
conception of "rights." If "rights" are whatever you can win in court
(American legal realism?), zealous advocacy and the adversary system may be
defended. In other words, zealous advocacy in the courtroom is designed to
"win," not to vindicate rights that should be won. Luban recognizes that his
rebuttal relies on a distinction between what a person is legally entitled to and
what the law can be made to give, a distinction that he maintains is crucial to
any argument that seeks to justify the adversary system on the ground that it
vindicates "rights."
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3. Luban's Conclusion
As promised, I will not address the other "goal oriented" argument and the
three "intrinsic" arguments except to observe that Luban examines each and
finds each wanting. But just as one expects him to conclude that he has
effectively demolished the arguments for the adversary system, he invites the
reader to ask the question as to what he would propose putting in its place. The
answer: "Nothing." Luban would retain the system, finding the justification in
American pragmatism. "The adversary system, despite its imperfections,
irrationalities, loopholes, and perversities, seems to do as good a job as any at
finding truth and protecting rights." He observed that none of the existing
rivals, the inquisitorial or socialist systems, are demonstrably better. Even if
one of the other systems were considered somewhat better, it would not be
worth the human costs of disrupting that which has become so intertwined in the
fabric of our society.
With the Luban conclusion that the adversary system is justified on
pragmatic grounds, you may wonder why I have spent so much time with the
arguments refuting its justification on goal-oriented and intrinsic grounds. As
long as it is justified on the pragmatic ground, what difference should it make
that it cannot be justified on the other grounds? I trust the answer to this
question will become apparent if the proponents of mediation are right in
contending that it is a process which can frequently be used as an alternative to
adjudication and which does not carry the unwanted baggage of adversary
procedure.
IV. MEDIATION
A movement begun some twenty-five years ago has come of age with its
credentials established by the widespread use of the acronym: ADR-
Alternative Dispute Resolution. Misconceptions abound as the title both
misleads and confuses. It misleads by suggesting that we have discovered
procedures that are "alternative" to the normal or standard process of
adjudication by courts. The vast majority of disputes have always been resolved
without court litigation. Actually, court litigation is not only the alternative but
the last alternative to other dispute resolution techniques. Secondly, ADR
confuses by suggesting that it encompasses procedures which, although different
from each other, may be grouped together for the purpose of distinguishing their
processes from the adversary nature of court litigation-that they provide
"kinder and gentler" means for resolving disputes than the combatant procedures
of courtroom adjudication. ADR. includes, however, arbitration, mini-trials,
summary jury trials, private judging (appoint-a-judge), and other procedures that
may be more expeditious and therefore responsive to complaints about
congestion in the courts. But these procedures are just as adversarial as
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courtroom trials. What unites them is that they are non-traditional-not that they
are non-adversarial. For the purpose of this Lecture, I want to concentrate on
the non-adversarial process of mediation.
A. Mediation: Emergence on the American Scene
Until the last several decades, mediation was a well-kept secret in our
country as a technique for private dispute settlement. Its prior use in resolving
labor-management disputes was not conceived as an alternative to litigation but
rather as a device to end the disruptive consequences of strikes when settlement
negotiations failed. In other lands and other cultures, mediation has been the
preferred dispute settlement mechanism for centuries, but it was not until the
1970s that it became of any significance in this country. Two concerns spurred
its beginnings, one pragmatic and the other idealistic. The first (supported by
the prestige of eminent federal judges) saw mediation as a cost-effective remedy
for the problems associated with congestion in the courts-delay, denial of
access, expense, etc. The other concern viewed mediation as a preferred
alternative to litigation in resolving community or neighborhood disputes.
To respond to these dual concerns of efficiency and community values, the
federal government funded pilot neighborhood justice centers in Atlanta, Kansas
City, and Los Angeles. Despite divergent assessments by critics of both the
efficiency and community value claims, the movement has accelerated to the
point that public mediation centers are operating in every major city of the
United States. In addition to the public and foundation-sponsored centers, a
second and growing part of the mediation network is that which is operated by
private, for-profit corporations of local, regional, and national scope. The
operations and the funding vary, but the process of mediation has become a
widespread alternative to the judicial process of adjudication. Ironically, it has
become so successful as an alternative to litigation that statutes and court rules
have co-opted it and made it a part of the judicial process. As you may suspect,
this development is not without a great deal of controversy and will deserve our
critical attention.
B. Mediation: Its Scope
Mediation is not for everyone and is not for every type of dispute. We
need to remember the Fuller analysis that the virtue of mediation is its
usefulness in resolving disputes between parties having relationships of heavy
interdependence. Its informality and flexibility make it especially appropriate
for allowing the participants to bargain and make compromises that could not be
accommodated within the formal structures of adjudication. The motivation for
both the willingness to bargain and the performance of the bargain stems from
the relationship of the parties. External standards and rules play minor roles.
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Individual circumstances shape the outcomes. The process emphasizes problem
solving, not winning and losing. Relationships conducive to the process would
include divorcing couples who have a joint interest in establishing financial and
custodial arrangements for minor children; neighbors for whom reconciliation
is essential for the good of the neighborhood; and parties to long-term contracts
who need each other to avoid disruptions in their respective businesses:
landlords and tenants, employers and employees, business partners, co-workers,
consumers and local merchants, homeowners and building contractors, etc.
Disputes for which mediation is contra-indicated would include the typical
tort case where the parties have not had and will not have any relationship
before or after the dispute; cases in which it is important to determine the legal
rights of the parties (mediation does not set precedents); cases in which there is
a power imbalance between the parties, such as most cases of spouse abuse; and
cases in which one party opposes the use of the process (mediation must be a
voluntary process to achieve its desired end). To list the above categories is to
indicate the need to match different processes with different kinds of disputes.
Whether attorneys are a reliable source for advice on such issues may well be
questioned on the ground that their training and practice have produced an
occupational mindset of hardball negotiating and adversary litigating.
The coming of age of alternative processes is recognized, however, in the
1992 ABA Report of The Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession:
Narrowing the Gap.4' In the statement of "Fundamental Lawyering Skills,"
one section is devoted to "Litigation and Alternative Dispute-Resolution
Procedures." 42 The complete text of the provisions relating to ADR is too
lengthy to quote verbatim, but the requirements noted in the section headings are
instructive: "(a) An awareness of the range of non-litigative mechanisms for
resolving disputes, including mediation," "(b) Familiarity with the basic
concepts and dynamics of these alternative mechanisms," "(c) An understanding
of the factors that should be considered in determining whether to pursue one
or another alternative-dispute resolution mechanism," and "(d) Familiarity with
the means for acquiring additional knowledge about the availability, relative
merits, processes, and procedures of the various alternative dispute-resolution
mechanisms.""' Would an attorney be guilty of malpractice for failing to
advise a client about the availability of mediation in an appropriate case? Armed
with this statement, the client would have a good case. Damages might be a bit
41. SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSION TO THE BAR, AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT-AN EDUCATIONAL
CONTINUUM, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING
THE GAP (1992).
42. Id. at 138 (emphasis added).
43. Id. at 196-98.
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of a problem, but they could be awarded on the difference between what the
lawyer charged for the services rendered in an adversarial capacity and what the
charge would have been if mediation had been utilized.
C. Mediation: Confidentiality
Mediators will argue that confidentiality is essential if the process is to
achieve its desired ends. The mediator cannot facilitate a satisfactory agreement
between the parties unless the full facts and interests of the parties are known.
Without the assurance that the information disclosed to the mediator will be held
in confidence, parties are unlikely to be candid and open during the course of
the mediation. Unfortunately for mediators and the parties, the legal situation
is murky. A leading casebook reports that there are over 200 state and federal
statutes and scores of reported decisions which relate to mediation
confidentiality.'M There is no consensus in the decisional law of a common law
privilege as there is between attorney and client or priest and penitent. And
decisions granting such a privilege are not always clear on who holds the
privilege: the parties, the mediator, the parties and the mediator, or each
participant as to statements made by that participant. Evidentiary rules preclude
admissibility of negotiations concerning a disputed claim to prove the claim or
its amount. But this exclusionary rule is a rather narrow protection because it
does not apply to pre-trial discovery and administrative proceedings, nor does
it preclude the use of the evidence when offered for other purposes, for
example, to prove bias of a witness or guilt of a defendant. The mediating
parties may agree to confidentiality, but this, too, offers inadequate protection
because the agreement may be construed to be as against public policy as one
which suppresses evidence.
Most mediators blithely ignore the uncertainty of the applicable law and
assure the parties at the outset of the mediation that they will hold the parties'
statements in confidence. Like reporters who go to jail to protect their sources,
mediators are imbued with what they consider an ethical duty to respect the
confidence. The need for legislation is exemplified by a Florida case and
statute. A Florida "Citizens Dispute Settlement" mediator was subpoenaed to
give deposition testimony in an attempted murder prosecution that during the
course of the mediation, the person who became the victim of the alleged
attempted murder made life threatening statements to the accused.4 5 The State
sought to quash the subpoena on the ground that the statements made to the
mediator were privileged. ' The trial court denied the motion and the appellate
court affirmed, stating that "privileges in Florida are no longer creatures of
44. STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG, ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION 179 (1992).
45. State v. Castellano, 460 So. 2d 480, 481 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
46. Id.
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judicial decision.""' Although the mediator had advised the parties that their
communications would be confidential, the court held that there was no legal
basis for the assurance: "If confidentiality is essential to the success of the
[mediation] program, the legislature is the proper branch of government from
which to obtain the necessary protection."' Responding to the court's
invitation, the legislature enacted a statute providing: "Any information relating
to a dispute obtained by any person [during a mediation] is privileged and
confidential and shall not be publicly disclosed without the written consent of all
parties to the dispute .... Each party ... has a privilege. . . to disclose and
to prevent another from disclosing communications made during such
proceedings, whether or not the dispute was successfully resolved. 49
D. Mandated Mediation
Mandated mediation sounds like an oxymoron. How can you mandate a
process whose internal morality rests on its being voluntary? I suppose the
answer is that nothing exists in the Constitution that prevents a legislature or
court from enacting or promulgating an oxymoron. But we should be clear that
the phrase does not mean that a result is mandated; only a good faith effort to
try to reach a result is required. In the last decade, courts in many states
operate under statutes and court rules that require, or that authorize courts to
require, mediation as a prerequisite to initiating litigation in specified types of
cases. The contexts vary widely and include a bewildering array of exceptions
and discretionary powers. A number of states have adopted a blanket statutory
requirement of mediation for contested divorce matters when the parties have
minor children. An increasing number of state supreme courts, including
Indiana's, have adopted rules of civil procedure incorporating mediation as part
of pre-trial procedure. These developments have even acquired a generic title:
"court-annexed mediation."
In the federal courts, the situation lacks clarity because of different
interpretations of a t-ial court's discretion in the application of Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 16,' a rule that authorizes a court to "direct the attorneys
for the parties to appear before it for a conference . . . [for purposes including]
facilitating the settlement of the case." SPIDR, the acronym for a national
organization of professionals in dispute resolution, has issued a lengthy report
with a guarded approval of mandated mediation, concluding that participation
should only be compulsory where the program is more likely to serve the
parties, the justice system, and the public. Critics are less sanguine about the
47. Id.
48. Id. at 481-82.
49. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 44.201(5) (West 1988).
50. FED. R. CRiM. P. 16.
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desirability of mandating a process whose empowering dynamic of self-
determination is fundamentally altered when it is imposed rather than sought.
Mandatory mediation becomes even more controversial when the rules or
statutes impose direct or indirect pressures to settle. As indicated at the outset,
it is participation that is mandated, not agreement. But how is participation to
be enforced? The Woody Allen aphorism that attributes ninety percent of
success in life to merely showing up is surely not applicable to merely showing
up for the mediation. Presence at the mediation proceeding can be enforced by
the contempt power. But what must you do to be in compliance after you have
shown up? The concept of "good faith bargaining" required in labor law is not
as attractive an analogy as it may appear, because the public interest and the
narrow context of labor-management disputes are distinguishing features. A
better analogy might be drawn from contract and commercial law, but we look
in vain for an explicit requirement of good faith bargaining in either the Uniform
Commercial Code or the Restatement of Contracts. Although good faith is one
of the pervasive concepts of the Code, it is explicitly required only with
reference to "performance and enforcement" of contracts.
In addition to good faith participation, many of the statutes and court rules
include formalized pressures to settle on terms proposed by the mediator.
Where a party has refused to settle, the rule may authorize transmittal of the
mediator's recommendation to the court. With the pressures of crowded
dockets, judges may be expected to accept the recommendations rather
uncritically. Other provisions contain financial disincentives to a party refusing
to agree to the mediator's proposal, such as the requirement that the refusing
party pay the other party's attorney's fees or other expenses if the result after
trial is not substantially better than the mediator's recommendation.
Constitutional provisions of trial by jury and due process are implicated when
pressures to settle so burden the right to trial that parties are not likely to pursue
it. And even if constitutional, it seems unwise to pressure parties into foregoing
their rights to a hearing guaranteeing basic legal protections.
E. The "Law" of Mediation
As mediation has grown, prospered, and become the subject of legislative
regulation, court rules, and judicial decisions, it may have sown the seeds of its
own destruction. It is the ultimate irony that a system lauded for its anti-
adversarial structure became co-opted by the adversarial process. Mediation had
the promise of quality solutions-solutions that the formal, adversarial judicial
process could not accommodate. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, a feminist and legal
process scholar, has sounded the alarm loudly and clearly:
[C]ourts try to use various forms of ADR to reduce caseloads and
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increase court efficiency at the possible cost of realizing better justice.
Lawyers may use ADR not for the accomplishment of a "better"
result, but as another weapon in the adversarial arsenal to manipulate
time, methods of discovery, and rules of procedure for perceived
client advantage. Legal challenges cause ADR "issues" to be decided
by courts. An important question that must be confronted is whether
forcing ADR to adapt to a legal culture or environment may be
counterproductive to the transformations proponents of ADR would
like to see in our disputing practices.5
The concerns expressed by Menkel-Meadow extend well beyond the scope
of our preceding discussion about mediation and the adversary system. They go
to the heart of our justice system. Many scholars would consider the ADR
movement too mundane to deserve their attention. But the issue that demands
critical thought is the process-substance debate, which is pervasive in concerns
aboutjustice. If mediation is pure "process," how can it ensure that results will
be in accord with substantive, normative standards (the "rule of law")?
V. ADJUDICATION VS. MEDIATION: THE IDEOLOGICAL DEBATE
A. Against Mediation
Much of.the spreading success of the ADR movement must be attributed
to perceived efficiency concerns: to save public and private expense and to
relieve court congestion. I have not dwelt on these issues for several reasons.
First, the empirical studies are inconclusive, and second, even if they were
conclusive, they would not carry the day against the substantive attacks made by
critics. The charge was led by Owen Fiss in an article titled Against
Settlement.52 In varying degrees and with different emphases, Fiss and other
critics view the informal, private "justice" of mediation as a threat to public
values, values of such stature that they should not be sacrificed simply to save
time and money. In other words, are we sacrificing the justice of public norms
for the sake of agreement? They argue that public, rule-based adjudication
protects fundamental, individual rights; promotes justice by reducing the
advantage of the rich over the poor and the strong over the weak; and develops
a body of precedent essential for the settlement of disputes in a pluralistic
society. The word "pluralistic" needs emphasis here. We do not have a
homogenous culture or a national community of shared values. Law is the glue
that is necessary to hold us together.
51. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale of Innovation
Co-Opted or "The Law of ADR," 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1991).
52. Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
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The rhetoric of the critics is compelling. Whether it conforms to reality
may well be questioned. Despite celebrated cases won by legal services
attorneys using the adversarial procedures, the judicial system has not been
distinguished in its protection of the disadvantaged and minorities. And the
"rule of law" means little to those who have no realistic access to the
cumbersome and expensive machinery of litigation. Legal service programs are
limited in funding and freedom to litigate. It has been estimated that one percent
of our population receives ninety-nine percent of the legal services provided. 3
Crowded court dockets cause delays, and litigation delayed is justice denied for
those who do not have the resources to wait. It remains true, however, that
mediation lacks the coercive power to rectify bargaining imbalances and that the
compromises struck in a settlement agreement frequently reflect the disparity of
resources rather than a responsible resolution of differences. The dilemma is
posed by the observations of Judith Resnik, who voices harsh criticism of the
existing system's inadequacies, but who also expresses mistrust of replacing it
with informal, unconstrained settlement mechanisms.1
4
B. Response to the Critics
The "public values" argument of the critics cannot be satisfactorily
countered by concerns of expediency. If the argument is to be met, it must be
on grounds of other public values. And perhaps we should not stress the word
'public', because the public-private distinction breaks down rather quickly with
the realization that the resolution of private disputes is a public issue. Value-
based responses have come from communitarian and feminist scholars. Before
discussing them, however, I should explain why I do not devote significant
attention to the Critical Legal Studies literature. First, I am not aware that the
CRITS have developed any passion for mediation and ADR. Having been
frustrated in trying to understand the CRIT literature, I admit the possibility that
I have simply not understood the way in which the CRIT scholars have
articulated their position. Certainly, they cannot agree with the Fiss-type
preference for adjudication and its reliance on the application of legal rules and
doctrines to protect public values. At least two "in's" characterize the critique
of the "law" by CRITS-the indeterminacy and incoherency of the present
system of rule and standard-based adjudication. Logic would seem to dictate
that they would prefer a system of dispute resolution that would draw upon
shared, community-based values, as mediators assist the parties to find
collaborative solutions to their disputes.
53. NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, PATHS To JUSTICE: MAJOR PUBLIC
POLICY ISSUES ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION 8 (1983).
54. Judith A. Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV.
494 (1986).
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1. Communitarian Jurisprudence
The ideological dimension of the adjudication versus mediation debate is
mirrored in contemporary discussions of political, moral, and legal philosophy.
It is a debate about the vision of the society that we hold, a debate between the
individualist and the communitarian. Bellah and his associates in Habits of the
Heart" examined the disenchantment of many persons in the struggle to
survive and prosper in our competitive social and economic environment. They
wanted to know: "Is this all there is?" They were not speaking to the need for
a different form of dispute resolution, but they were emphasizing the
transformative capacity of involvement in community as affecting the quality of
life style and in converting people from inner-directed self interest to outer-
directed concern for the common good. Competition and community have
always been in tension, but our society seems to have given the nod to individual
rights as being a more significant value than community responsibility.
Signs exist, however, that this view is changing and schools of
philosophical thought have developed under the banner of communitarianism.
No attempt will be made here to distinguish the variant strands of communitarian
philosophy. An illustration may suffice, however, to depict one of the values
attributed to it. In a report of a landlord-tenant mediation, an observer noted
that during the course of the mediation, the parties realized their power to
resolve the dispute by themselves, even if a court's resolution might have been
different.' They did not have to appeal to an outside institution. And as the
parties realized their own power, they were able to let go of their preoccupation
with individual concerns. "Each was able to transcend his narrow self-interest,
to realize and recognize-even if only fleetingly-some element of legitimacy in
the other side's position, some element of common humanity with the other
party. " s The observer saw the mediation as a "direct education and growth
experience," which, in a democracy, warrants classification as a crucial public
value, one which could not have been realized from an adjudication.'
Thomas Shaffer and Andrew McThenia have responded directly to Fiss'
charge that mediation lacks a public value base. According to them, mediation
"rests on values-of religion, community and work place .... Settlement is a
process of reconciliation in which the anger of broken relationships is to be
confronted rather than avoided, and in which healing demands not a truce but
55. ROBERT N. BEL.AH, ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART (1985).
56. Robert A. Baruch Bush, Mediation and Adjudication, Dispute Resolution and Ideology:
An Imaginary Conversation, 3 J. CONTEMP. LEOAL ISSUES 1 (1989-1990).
57. Id. at 11.
58. Id. at 11-12.
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confrontation ... it calls on substantive community values."59
The Shaffer-McThenia thesis finds a parallel in Jewish law. According to
the Code of Maimonides, in every civil case the rabbinical court must attempt
to persuade the parties to agree to a compromise settlement rather than seek
formal adjudication.' The rationale for the rule emphasizes the value of
encouraging individuals to expand their narrow self-centeredness and reach out
to a level of consideration for others. The observations of a commentator are
of special significance to the Fiss' criticism:
As for sacrificing other values like social justice, societal welfare, and
so on-values that are indeed important in that Talmudic system
too-the implication is that those values are nevertheless secondary.
Like the adjudication process that secures them, they are fallbacks to
be sought when self-transcendence cannot be directly accomplished in
the mediation process. Or maybe more accurately, they are less direct
and slower ways of accomplishing the ultimate goal of self-
transcendence: they force people to behave as if they have concern
for others . . . more than or as much as for themselves. 6'
With reference to mediation and religious communities, I would be especially
derelict in this time and place if I did not call attention to the fact that the
Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod at its last convention completely amended its
adjudicatory dispute settlement mechanisms with an elaborate system of
mediation procedures.
The virtues of community are patent, but the concept is illusive. We live
in different communities. As academics, we talk of a university community.
But we also belong to the communities of our different disciplines. And our
loyalties to each are frequently in competition with each other. Time spent in
campus-wide committees and concerns competes with time for research, writing,
and teaching in one's discipline. Building a sense of community is more
difficult than exercising one's individuality. How does this relate to mediation?
A true community depends on shared values. When the members of a
community share values, they, by definition, exclude those who do not subscribe
to those values. So communities exclude each other and a pluralistic society has
a pluralism of communities. My China experience62 may demonstrate the
point. After witnessing mediation in China, a number of my fellow travelers
59. Andrew W. McThenia & Thomas L. Shaffer, For Reconciliation, 94 YALE L.J. 1660, 1667
(1985).
60. Id. at 17.
61. Id. at 17-18.
62. See supra note *
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were ecstatic with the prospect of employing their mediation techniques in our
country. What they had witnessed, however, was mediation being conducted in
a society far more homogeneous than ours. The admonition, "We don't do
things that way," addressed to one of the parties to a dispute has a special
meaning and force when the party is one of the "we." It is therefore no
surprise that mediation flourishes to the extent that it can be employed in a
distinctive constituency such as a religious organization, neighborhood, or
community of racial or ethnic homogeneity.
2. Feminist Jurisprudence-A Different Voice?
In the decade since the publication of Carol Gilligan's In a Different
Voice,63 feminism has spoken with many different voices. But the Gilligan
thesis remains influential and bears special significance to our philosophical
debate. It has similarities to the communitarian response in that it challenges the
individual, rights-based values upon which Fiss and others rely. It does so,
however, with an emphasis on the gender-based and therefore gender-biased
nature of an individual rights philosophy. Gilligan told us that women see moral
issues not in terms of rights and rules, but in terms of relationships and
responsibilities. They are by nature more concerned with nurturing, caring, and
problem solving than with competitive situations and personal achievement. A
legal system incorporating the Gilligan thesis would place less emphasis on rules
and precedents, would search for solutions based on contexts and relationships,
and would encourage disputing parties to work out their differences after seeking
to understand each other's point of view. Also, the attorneys would be less
oriented toward advocacy and more toward problem solving. The analogy of
this version of feminism to the adjudication-mediation debate is too obvious for
comment. What requires emphasis is that the Gilligan thesis has not won many
converts in feminist jurisprudence. As a matter of fact, the feminist critics see
Gilligan as the problem rather than the solution in remedying the injustice of a
male-dominated culture. By attributing a different "nature" to women, Gilligan
has played into the hands of those who would perpetuate the male domination
that has pervaded our cultural institutions. I am thankful that I do not have the
time to get into this controversy. I would only observe that its merits should not
affect the adjudication-mediation debate. Neither mediation nor adjudication
should be preferred because of gender considerations.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Lecture has been titled, "To Adjudicate or Mediate: That is the
63. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S
DEVELOPMENT (1982).
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Question." There is only one thing wrong with this title-I left out a "not." It
should have been, "To Adjudicate or Mediate: That is Not the Question." The
two are not mutually exclusive. One is not better than the other; both are
necessary and desirable methods of dispute settlement. Adherents of
adjudication are right in heralding the process as the best method yet contrived
for discharging the state's responsibility to resolve a dispute. When called upon
to do so, judges and juries must decide and apply the coercive power of the
sovereign to enforce their judgments. Coercive power is always subject to
abuse, but what better protection against abuse can there be than a process that
grants to the disputing parties and their representatives a public opportunity to
participate in the process by presenting evidence and reasoned arguments to an
impartial decision-maker. The adversary system is not the culprit; it is the
abuse of the system that needs constant surveillance and indicated reforms. The
ADR movement is ill-advised when it argues for supplanting adjudication with
mediation. It is well-advised to argue that all disputes should not require
adjudication and that communities, both public and private, should
institutionalize procedures and opportunities for the utilization of mediation
where a dispute involves parties with ongoing relationships. From the messianic
fervor that attended the beginnings of the movement, ADR now confronts the
reality of making the idealism of the founders workable in the crucible of the
real world-which, despite occasional references to the "academic world," is the
only world we've got.
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